Friday, March 4, 2016

RSA Talk - “IOCs are Dead - Long Live IOCs!” - Ryan Kazanciyan

RSA Talk - “IOCs are Dead - Long Live IOCs!” - Ryan Kazanciyan

Ryan Kazanciyan, Chief Security Architect, Tanium ( @ryankaz42
Co-Author, Incident Response & Computer Forensics (book website: https://ir3e.com/ )

This talk was delivered 04 March 2016 at the RSA Conference in San Francisco. 

I'm providing a brief reaction/summary, and then my notes. The notes are my sort-of free-form notes, so if they are only semi-comprehensible.

REACTION:
I’ve always been skeptical of the threat intel (really mostly threat data) trend. It’s not a bad idea, but it seems like really just a new analogue to signature-based detection; it can only help detect something that someone else has already detected someplace else.

Ryan shares my concerns with the use of threat data, and gives some other reasons why its use is problematic. Not only is the data by definition incapable of deleting truly NEW threats, but it is inconsistent and often of dubious use even for its intended purpose(s). He gives some good ways to make better use of such data, as well as some methods of scouring your own systems for high-value threat data.

NOTES:
Five years ago, the compiling and sharing of indicators of compromise (IOC) seemed like it would “save the world” from attacks.

Today, this has still not become a reality.

Problems:
  • Brittle indicators with a short shelf life
  • Poor quality of data in IOC feeds
  • hard to build effective home-grown IOCs
  • Tool for ingesting and detecting IOCs are inconsistent in quality
  • IOCs are applied to a limited scope of data

Threat Intelligence is not equivalent to threat data
- Intelligence includes context and analysis
- However, good threat data is required for useful intelligence
- For this talk, we’re just talking about threat data, not intelligence

IOCs are Brittle:
  • IP addresses and malware file hashes are most common
  • URLs/hostnames are next most common
  • File names are another common type
  • 4/5 of malware types last less than a week; 95% less than a month
  • C2 IPs and domains have a short lifespan
  • Shared hosting means malicious sites often share an IP with compromised hosts (leads to false positives)
  • Even paid feeds are not necessarily high quality
  • Informal look at IOCs from paid, subscriber-only feeds
    • File IOCs that include both hash and filename (filename easily changed, will lead to false negatives)
    • File hashes included for files that are unique to a specific host
    • Legitimate software libraries included as malware hashes because they were leveraged in some piece of malware
  • Hard to avoid being too specific (leading to false negatives) or too general (leading to false positives)
  • High-effort IOCs work for a specific investigation, but not for generic use across enterprises

IOC Detection Tools are Inconsistent:
  • Tools support (and don’t support) different observables from standards (OpenIOC, Cybox, STIX, YARA, etc.).
  • Logic structures in IOCs are not always implemented in the same way.
  • Data normalization is a problem.
  • The standards have some issues. E.g., OpenIOC was not created intentionally as a standard, but is merely the XML format created for Mandiant’s MIR tool. This has led to some serious issues.

Broadening the Scope of Endpoint Indicator Usage:
  • Most common host data in SIEMs:
    • AV/anti-malware
    • HIPS logs
    • Event log data, usually for only a subset (e.g. servers)
  • Things like file hashes will therefore simply never be seen in the SIEM.
  • Matching on forensic telemetry data
  • Matching on live endpoints:
    • Gives access to everything in memory, files on disk, and event logs.
    • Can be high-impact and hard to scale.
  • The Goal:
    • Mixture of the above methods to maximize the value of brittle IOCs.
    • Increase cadence of analysis as tools & resources permit.
    • Taking shortcuts in coverage (“I only need to check my most important systems”) will leave gaps and lead to failure.
    • Malicious code and actions rarely take place on the actual target servers.

Shrinking the Detection Gap:
  • The most relevant threat intelligence is what comes from within your own environment.
  • Over time, the effectiveness of looking for known IOCs has decreased.
  • Looking for attacker methodology and outlier files/behaviors has correspondingly become more effective.
  • The reality is that automation using known IOCs/threat data is good at finding the easiest things to find.
  • Preventative controls need to fill a large part of that gap, as does internal analysis.

Looking inward to hunt:
  • Derive intelligence from what is “normal"
  • Build repeatable analysis tasks — a repeatable process
  • More is not always better — start small with high-value indicators
  • “What easily observable outlier conditions do intruder actions create?"

Example of Duqu 2.0 report:
  •  All the various samples created a scheduled task to run an msiexec.exe command.
  • However, the provided IOCs consisted of a long list of file hashes and C2 IPs.

Example of analysis of scheduled tasks:
  • create list of what accounts are used to run scheduled tasks
  • create list of what actions/programs are being run using scheduled tasks
  • Look through this for outliers

"Hunting in the Dark” talk gives more detailed examples. https://speakerdeck.com/ryankaz

Things to check out:

Questions for your threat feed vendor:
  • Where is the data coming from?
    • actual IR engagements
    • honeypots
    • auto-generated sandbox data
    • firewall and other device/system data
  • What is the breakdown of observable types? (IPs vs URLs vs file hashes, etc)
  • What is the QC process? (if there is one!)

RSA Talk - “The Pivot” - Jonathan Trull

RSA Talk - “The Pivot” - Jonathan Trull, VP for Information Security, Optic ( @jonathantrull


This talk was delivered 04 March 2016 at the RSA Conference in San Francisco. 
I'm providing a brief reaction/summary, and then my notes. The notes are my sort-of free-form notes, so if they are only semi-comprehensible.

REACTION:
The idea that we need to move beyond just perimeter protection and do better on detection of and response to ongoing intrusions is a repeated theme in the industry over the past several years. Many organizations are still not really implementing this, though, or implementing it well.

This was a great talk with lots of good practical ideas for defense that are implementable my mid-sized organizations. See the notes for specific technical details, but the key points are:
  • Don’t just go with default logging settings on devices and security tools.
  • Central logging and analysis is key.
  • Develop a strategy of specific indicators to look for to make that central logging and analysis effective.

NOTES:
Attackers’ immediate goal is to exploit and compromise a host.
However, this is not their true goal. They want to get deeper and gain access to your key systems and information.

To do this requires the attacker to move on from that initial compromised host — to pivot.

On average, attackers’ “dwell time” in a victim network is 205 days (2015 numbers from Verizon DBIR).
Organizations are still most frequently made aware of compromises by law enforcement or other contacts from outside the organization.
"We don’t necessarily have to be that good, but we have to be better than this."

60% of attackers are able to compromise an organization within minutes.
75% spread from Victim 0 to Victim 1 within 24 hours.

Time is NOT on Our Side:
  • 50% of users open emails and click on phishing links/attachments within 1 hours.
  • Median time to first click is 1 minute, 22 seconds.
  • Half of CVEs are being actively exploited within a month of their publication.

Optiv Simulated Attack Lifecycle:
- Set up lab environment with nine common types of security software/tools
- Conducted simulated attacks: exploitation, lateral movement, exfiltration
- Monitored tools to see what they were able to do to aid in detection of these attacks

How attackers typically pivot & move laterally in a network:
  • leveraging native tools: cmd.exe, powershell, at.exe, Net use, WMI
    • Difficult to detect, as no software is written when these tools are being used
  • using tools to compromise creds: Mimikatz, WCE

Telltale signs of a pivot:
  • Signs can appear on the source host where the attacker is already operating, on the destination machine that they are trying to access, and on the network between them
  • Unusual use of commands that end-users rarely use: scheduled tasks (at.exe), WMI, PowerShell, RDP
  • nmap and ncat and other similar things occasionally; also sysinternals tools (PSExec, 
  • mapping shares
  • Windows Event Logs
  • Events to look for:
    • Account lockout (4740)
    • User added to privilege group (4728, 4732, 4756)
    • Security-enabled group modification (4735)
    • Successful User Account Login (4624)
    • Failed User Account Login (4625)
    • Account Login with Explicit Credentials (4648)
    • Process Created (4688)
    • Service Being Started (7035/7036)
  • Windows Logon Types:
    • Interactive
    • Network
    • batch (scheduled tasks)
    • Service
    • Unlock
  • Using Process Created Event (4688)
    • documents process, user, and parent process
    • Does NOT include command line arguments (by default)
    • This is disabled by default — can be enabled by Group Policy
      • Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Advanced Audit Configuration > Detailed Tracking
    • Enable command line args by Group Policy also
      • Enable via GPO – “Include command line in process creation events”
  • Prefetch Files
    • Good place for forensic analysis to see executable, DLLs called, count of times process has run, most recent run time
    • WinPrefetchView
  • Windows Special Groups
    • Introduced in Windows 7/Windows Server 2008
    • Tracks logons of privileged accounts
    • Event ID 4964
  • Pass the Hash
    • Event ID 4624 (for success; 4625 if failed) - Logon Type 3, Auth Package NTLM
    • Filter: Not a domain logon, not an anonymous logon
  • New Scheduled Tasks
    • Event ID 7035 created by at[#].exe
  • Privilege Escalation
    • Login from one non-workstation host to another non-workstation host
    • Login from one workstation to another
    • Login with service account (or attempt to do so)
    • Creation of new domain admin (or elevation of account)

How to identify/detect the signs and defend against the pivot:
  • 100,000 foot view vs. In the weeds

Optic’s Results on Comparing Seven Common Endpoint Security Solutions:
  • Intentionally unpatched/vulnerable hosts
  • Endpoint security solution was the only defense measure on the host
  • Types:
    • Endpoint Protection Platforms (full suites)
    • Exploitation Mitigation
    • Exploit Detection and Response (EDR) with App Control (whitelisting)
    • EDR without App Control
  • None of the types of controls were silver bullets
  • None blocked most pivot attempts; EDR partially blocked most types
  • Generally they logged the info necessary to detect the pivot, but not clear out-of-the box (required research and testing to find)

Takeaways:
  • Enable sufficient logging
  • Develop a threat model for how an attacker would go after your “crown jewels"
  • Central logging and analysis is key
  • Consider using honeypot(s)
  • Implement enhanced authentication for admins and pass-the-hash mitigation


http://www.secopslabs.com has some results and other details and recommendations 

RSA Talk - “Defense in Depth is Dead; Long Live Depth in Defense" - Matt Alderman

RSA Talk - “Defense in Depth is Dead; Long Live Depth in Defense" - Matt Alderman

Matt Alderman ( @maldermania ) is VP of Strategy at Tenable Network Security.

This talk was delivered 03 March 2016 at the RSA Conference in San Francisco. I'm providing a brief reaction/summary, and then my notes. The notes are my sort-of free-form notes, so if they are only semi-comprehensible.

REACTION:
I’m not convinced this is particularly valuable distinction. The title and terminology makes it sound more radical than it is. The real message appears to be simply that we need to more closely integrate and monitor our defenses, which is unquestionably a good point and a vital strategy.

NOTES:

Defense in depth isn’t helping us tackle the attacks we are facing.

The traditional defense in depth model includes:
  • Prevention
  • Detection
  • Response

We haven’t connected the different solutions at the different security layers, so there are gaps that intruders hide in.
The different solution at the different layers are often managed and owned by different group in the organization.

“It is time to declare that defense in depth is dead; we need a new approach."

The depth in defense model:
  • Visibility
    • Discover - assets (physical & virtual, apps, data, mobile, cloud)
    • Assess - vuln assessment, config audit, malware detection
  • Context
    • Monitor - log collection, activity monitoring, packet inspection, threat intel
    • Analyze - event correlation, anomaly detection, behavioral analysis
  • Action
    • Respond - Notification & alerting, remediation, patch mgmt
    • Protect - path installation, config changes, port/service modification, device isolation

This model provides:
  • Visibility
  • Context
  • Action

How do I get started?
  • Do you have continuous visibility to identify unknown assets/devices?
  • Do you have continuous visibility into the security state of your assets?
  • Do you have critical context to prioritize threats and weaknesses?
  • Do you have critical context to measure security posture & assurance?
  • Are you able to take decisive action to respond to attacks?
  • Are you able to take decisive action to remediate your assets?




Thursday, March 3, 2016

RSA Talk - "Sophisticated Attacks vs. Advanced Persistent Security” - The Irari Report team

This talk was given on 03 March 2016 at the RSA Conference in San Francisco by:

Ira Winkler, CISSP President Secure Menem @irawinkler 
Araceli Treu Gomes, Subject Matter Expert – Intelligence and Investigations, Dell SecureWorks @sleepdeficit_ 


I'm providing a brief reaction/summary, and then my notes. The notes are my sort-of free-form notes, so if they are only semi-comprehensible.

REACTION:
Nothing really new or revolutionary here, but a good summary overview of what adversaries are and aren’t doing to perpetrate attacks, and what organizations are and aren’t doing to stop them. Key takeaways:
  • Even most high-profile attacks really aren’t all that sophisticated, just persistent, adaptive, and opportunistic.
  • Security needs to be adaptive.
  • Assume you won’t achieve perfect prevention, so ensure you can backstop prevention with detection and response.
  • The role of the human is vital; it’s not just a technology problem.

NOTES:

Why the Hype Matters to Us (Why it Hurts Our Efforts)
- It destroys our focus
- It changes the story
- It leads to asking the wrong questions
- It deflects blame
- If the attacks are so “sophisticated” and even the top organizations can be hit, nobody will expect us to actually stop attacks.

“Sophisticated” Attack:   (the Hacking Team hack)
- Password was “passw0rd"
- Able to access and download data as engineer
- The network was apparently flat, allowing open access to data
- Sophisticated? HELL NO!

IRS Breach:
- 400k plus records compromised
- ~$50M dollars stolen
- Compromised authentication scheme
     - Required information “only the taxpayer had” (info from credit report/tax returns)
- IRS Commissioner said they couldn’t have stopped this, because:
     - Smart criminals used lots of advanced computers and hired smart people
- Went undetected for the first 400k attempts

Ashley Madison:
- Compromise of clients and client info
- Violated terms of service (didn’t delete accounts and data as promised)
- Probably carried out via SQL injection (one doc stolen and released by the attackers was an internal security audit saying they had a SQL injection problem!)
- Pass1234 was the root password on all servers
- Poor password encryption
- Network was poorly segmented, allowing for easy lateral movement

Anthem & Premera (and 275 other healthcare orgs):
- 80M records lost at Anthem, 11M at Premera
- Watering hole attack suspected at Anthem
- Phishing attack suspected at Premera
- Admin creds stolen
- Both went undetected for ~9 months
- Massive querying of data (i.e., it should have been detectable)

Common Problems:
- Improperly segmented networks
- Poor monitoring/detection
- Not monitoring what matters
- No whitelisting
- No multi-factor authentication
- Phishing messages

So what IS a sophisticated attack?
- Not caused by phishing
- Malware not detectable by signature
- Not an easily-guessable password
- Not exploiting a know vuln for which a patch was available
- Multifactor auth was in use
- Decent detection tech was in use and being paid attention to
- Proper network segmentation in use
- Least privilege in effect

Advanced Persistent Threat? 
No. ADAPTIVE Persistent Threat
- “Advanced” implies they are sophisticated and unstoppable
- “Adaptive” implies that they are finding the weakness in your system
- Successful APT attacks exploit unforced errors on your part

Advanced Persistent Security Program
- be adaptive
- assume failure
- exfiltration prevention > intrusion prevention
- disruption is an acceptable strategy





RSA Talk - "Proactive Measures to Mitigate Insider Threat" - Andrew Case


Andrew Case ( @attrc ), Director of Research at Volexity, an infosec advisory firm headquartered in Washington, DC.

This talk was given on 02 March 2016 at the RSA Conference in San Francisco. The talk was surprisingly well-attended; the most packed session I’ve been to. I guess insider threat is weighing heavy on people's minds these days?

I'm providing a brief reaction/summary, and then my notes. The notes are my sort-of free-form notes, so if they are only semi-comprehensible.

REACTION:
Andrew's case examples were very interesting, and the strategies he gives are sensible, if not revolutionary. Limiting and monitoring the use of removable media and of cloud file sync/storage services is a strong recommendation which I make to many of my clients. Identifying where your key intellectual property is located and concentrating monitoring on those locations is another excellent recommendation. Separation of duties is a common requirement, but a difficult one for many organizations to implement. Tighter controls on users at termination and inventory of issued equipment down to the level of noting serial numbers of hard drives and other components of laptops is also a stretch for most organizations.

NOTES:

PWC on insider-driven incidents:
- 70% of incidents
- 60% of incidents at manufacturing orgs

Verizon DBIR:  20.6% of incidents characterized as insider incidents

Approaches to insider threat

Typical approach is passive defense against insider threat:
-No special/extra logging or security measures
-No automated alerting or remote logs
- This is easy and provides the data needed for forensics after the fact
- However, anti-forensic techniques can defeat these measures, and they make no progress toward eliminating/preventing the threat

Next level is Detection:
- enhanced logging (e.g. file access, removable media usage)
- Generate alerts on defined events
- This can inhibit malicious insiders and find activity before it causes greatest potential harm
- Sometimes doesn’t allow for response until irreparable harm is done
- Requires significant active effort from security team

Next level is Prevention:
- Prevent use of removable media
- Block personal email and file sync/storage services
- Block end-user software installation
- Stops many activities before they start, and is cheapest approach once implemented
- May be a problem in company culture, and can inhibit productivity, especially for particular departments/users/roles

Andrew suggested that the ideal strategy may be somewhere between the Detection and Prevention models.

Real World Case Examples of Insider-related Incidents

Case #1:
Financial institution employee leaves and takes many employees and 1/3 of employees with him.
- also took many key documents with him

Investigation showed that the victim’s network was very open and access was not very limited.
User had access to file servers and applications/databases for which he had no legitimate need.
Data was removed via USB, personal email, and printing.

Solution recommendations:
  • Secure Network Architecture
  • Monitor file share access
  • Concentrate monitoring around key sensitive file data
  • Limit USB drive/removable media access
  • Limit use of personal email accounts and cloud file storage/sync
  • Address printing and scanning as an exfiltration method (hard problem)

Case #2: Abuse of Power
Plant manager at manufacturing company using “down time” on company’s machines to run a side business.
Some material were purchased personally, others were ordered using the company’s accounts.
Only detected when a machine malfunctioned.

Potential signs that were missed:
  • Perpetrator logged in to control systems during off hours 
  • Manufacturing jobs were scheduled with no associated customer work order
  • Perpetrator deleted files and logs to cover his tracks

Problem was, the plant manager was the primary operator/administrator of the systems whose logs could have indicated his malfeasance.

Solution Recommendations:
  • Monitor user logins
  • Monitor system usage
  • Alert on anomalous indicators of the above!
  • Don’t allow one person to control all aspects of key business processes. There must be someone else in the loop and someone else auditing the process.

Case #3: Offline Exfiltration
Victim organization had very tight data exile controls
User removed hard drive from his PC, brought it home, and used forensic tools to remove data
Hard drive was unencrypted

Solution Recommendations:
  • Utilize full disk encryption (FDE) for everything
  • Check out offline decryption capabilities of your FDE solution

Case #4: Anti-Forensics
Two key employees leave the victim company simultaneously.
Soon after, important clients began terminating contracts.
Company found their clients were moving to a brand new company founded by… the two departed employees.

Both employees had done factory reset on their company-provided Android phones.
One employee ran CCleaner before turning in his laptop.
Other employee replaced the hard drive on his laptop with a brand-new drive of same make and model.

Solution Recommendations:
- track application downloads and installs (prevent use of anti-forensics software)
- application whitelisting (prevent use of anti-forensics software)
- better termination procedures:
     - assess and preserve employee equipment post-termination
     - don’t immediately re-use systems after someone leaves
     - check components against inventory
     - check historical use of removable media
(Andrew made the point that these types of stricter checks might be done only in certain cases, e.g., key employees, those with access to highly sensitive data, and those leaving under bad circumstances.


Other Overall Recommendation:
- Consider bringing in an outside party for a “capture the flag” exercise, similar to an insider pen-test, to see if they can gain access to and exfiltrate specific data without detection.




Wednesday, March 2, 2016

RSAConference Talk "Giving the Bubble Boy an Immune System so He Can Play Outside" - Kevin Mahaffey

Kevin Mahaffey ( @dropalltables ) is the founder and CTO of Lookout, one of the first mobile-centric security/anti-malware companies. 

This talk is intended to explore how many large and forward-thinking companies are removing many traditional elements of security architecture (e.g., anti-virus, VPNs, firewalls) in favor of a data-driven security model. The talk was given on 02 March 2016 at the RSA Conference in San Francisco.

I'm providing a brief reaction/summary, and then my notes. The notes are my sort-of free-form notes, so if they are only semi-comprehensible.

REACTION:
I am a big fan of the concept of internal resilience and immunity as an approach to security, as opposed to building a bigger, better wall at the perimeter. This is a more and more important approach as mobile devices, BYOD, external cloud service providers, and other trends take hold in organizations. I'm not convinced that the data-driven approach is the road forward, though. Data analytics is a powerful tool, but at some point it becomes an exercise in navel-gazing. If you literally log and watch everything, including the system that is storing and analyzing the logs, the data grows virtually without limit. Big data technologies are making this more practical, but detection and remediation still lag. The ideas Kevin is sharing are very interesting, but these methods still seem like an enhancement to me, rather than a replacement for traditional security devices/software.

The best resource mentioned was the Google "Beyond Corp" paper.

NOTES:

The real world does not match the theoretical model of secure system architectures. Mobile and other devices may not be patchable by the organization, vendor-owned/managed systems are present, and users find ways to “work around” policies and safeguards.

The typical approach to security architecture attempts to create a sterile environment inside the network, keeping all the “bad things” out. The evolutionary analogy is that the skin provides a barrier, but it does not, and is not intended to, keep everything bad out. There is an intricate immune system to detect and defeat pathogens that make it past the skin level.

Least (manageable) privilege is a typical "solution" to the permissions problem
- complex to manage
- become calcified and doesn’t respond to changing requirements (“privilege accretion”)

"We need to engineer an immune system” for the organizational network.
- operationalized data + automation
Analogous to the way credit card fraud prevention works. You don’t need to get permission ahead of time to do something; instead transactions are analyzed and likely malicious/fraudulent actions are identified and dealt with.


Facebook and Square push user auth and some alert response to users and managers instead of IT or SecOps.

AEDA loop — Acquire, Enrich, Decide, Act

Acquire: 
“I’ve never heard anyone say they have TOO MUCH visibility into their infrastructure."
If a given component were compromised, what specific data element would clearly indicate that?
“Should we put sensors on the device or the network?"
- both have problems
- on-device sensors have a compromise race condition; malware can potentially disable the sensor

The Privilege Accretion problem:
- privileges get added when needed, but not removed when no longer needed
- Square’s system   Diogo Monica’s talk at Security@Scale
- model privileges to roles
- Emergency “break glass” access; can be used, but generates an alert when used

Enrich:
Many security analytic data systems don’t have enough data to be effective
You’re forced to choose between too many false positives or too many false negatives.
The only way to get better is to add more context.
Other times, there is enough (or too much) data, but it’s not operationalized/useable.

Two techniques:
- analyzing data
     - data -> information -> knowledge -> wisdom
     - static/dynamic analysis of executables
     - parsing of protocols
     - data normalization
     - “You can’t extract information that’s unsupported by the underlying data."
- joining data
     - isolated data is of limited value
     - provides context
     - foreign key problem - can’t join datasets that have > 1 factor to correlate
     - data must be normalized for smooth joining

Must ensure that data sources are accounted for in terms of reliability and trust.

Decide:
Input -> Model

Anomaly Detection
- Good, in that it can find novel threats
- Bad, in that new things happen all the time that are valid and benign
- anomalies, on their own, are not sufficient as indicators

Supervised Machine Learning
- train the system with inputs that have known outputs
- train the system to arrive at the expected output from those training inputs

Combined Systems are generally going to be the solution.

Malware Models:
-Known Malware
-Correlated 0-day
     - traverse connections to known malware
-Uncorrelated 0-day
     - expensive and noisy

Machines (currently) cannot make all the decisions.
Over-Automation or automating too quickly can create, essentially, an autoimmune disease.

Act:

Start by improving your IR team’s UX (user experience)
- gather all the data in one place (e.g., SIEM)
- ensure it is useable

Build feedback loops
- figure out what works and what doesn’t, and change functionality in response

Pull humans out, a little at a time
- start by having machines recommend actions, with humans approving
- if rejection rates are low (maybe under 1% or even 0.1%) you can 
- retain “circuit breakers” that keep a human in the loop if actions are particularly critical or if decision volume is high

Square “Sting” system sends some alerts to humans. 
- similar to how credit card companies ask the user if they have taken an action and if it was intentional
- also cuts rate of alert-creating actions